Cognitive Structuring and Its Cognitive-Motivational Determinants as an Explanatory Framework of the Fear-Then-Relief Social Influence Strategy by Dariusz Dolinski et al.
fpsyg-08-00114 January 27, 2017 Time: 8:19 # 1
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 30 January 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00114
Edited by:
Mark Hallahan,
College of the Holy Cross, USA
Reviewed by:
Nehama Lewis,
University of Haifa, Israel
Stephen Garcia,
University of Michigan, USA
*Correspondence:
Dariusz Dolinski
ddolinsk@swps.edu.pl
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Personality and Social Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 12 October 2016
Accepted: 17 January 2017
Published: 30 January 2017
Citation:
Dolinski D, Dolinska B and Bar-Tal Y
(2017) Cognitive Structuring and Its
Cognitive-Motivational Determinants
as an Explanatory Framework of the
Fear-Then-Relief Social Influence
Strategy. Front. Psychol. 8:114.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00114
Cognitive Structuring and Its
Cognitive-Motivational Determinants
as an Explanatory Framework of the
Fear-Then-Relief Social Influence
Strategy
Dariusz Dolinski1*, Barbara Dolinska2 and Yoram Bar-Tal3
1 Faculty of Psychology in Wroclaw, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Wroclaw, Poland, 2 Faculty of
Social Sciences, Opole University, Opole, Poland, 3 Sackler Faculty of Medicine, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel
According to the fear-then-relief technique of social influence, people who experience
anxiety whose source is abruptly withdrawn usually respond positively to various
requests and commands addressed to them. This effect is usually explained by the
fact that fear invokes a specific program of action, and that when the source of this
emotion is suddenly and unexpectedly removed, the program is no longer operative,
but the person has not yet invoked a new program. This specific state of disorientation
makes compliance more likely. In this paper, an alternative explanation of the fear-then-
relief effect is offered. It is assumed that the rapid change of emotions is associated
with feelings of uncertainty and confusion. The positive response to the request is a
form of coping with uncertainty. In line with this reasoning, while individuals with a high
need for closure (NFC) should comply with a request after a fear-then-relief situation,
low NFC individuals who are less threatened by uncertainty should not. This assumption
was confirmed in the experiment.
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INTRODUCTION
The literature on persuasion and compliance provides descriptions of various procedures
increasing the likelihood of compliance (see: Cialdini, 2001; Pratkanis, 2007; Dolinski, 2016;
O’Keefe, 2016 for review). One such technique is the fear-then-relief strategy. In many experiments,
it has been shown that when people experience a source of fear that is then rapidly removed, they
are more likely to comply with a subsequent request. For example, in one set of studies participants
were led to believe they had received a parking ticket or were caught jaywalking, which then turned
out to be a false alarm. The ticket was in fact an advert for a hair formula, while the person blowing a
whistle on the jaywalker was not the expected police officer, but rather a smiling jokester (Dolinski
and Nawrat, 1998). In such cases, people were more likely to comply with a request to fill out
a burdensome questionnaire or make a donation to an orphanage. How can the mechanism of
compliance in such situations be understood? This finding is usually explained by noting that
the state of sudden and unexpected relief from fear produces a temporal mindlessness (Dolinski,
2001, 2016). This interpretation is in accordance with the results of the experiment by Dolinski
and Nawrat (1998), inspired by a study conducted by Langer et al. (1978). The participants were
individuals crossing the street where it was not allowed. In one condition the fact was just recorded,
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while in the second the participants heard a police whistle
(produced by the experimenter) as they crossed the street. Next,
each participant was approached by a confederate asking for
a donation. As in the original study by Langer et al. (1978),
he formulated either the request only, the request with a real
justification, or the request with a placebic justification. The
results showed that in the control condition people usually
behaved in a thoughtful manner. They hardly ever decided to
give a donation when the request was not accompanied by any
justification, nor when the justification was placebic, and more
often made a donation when it was explained to them who was
collecting the money and for what purpose. The participants
in the fear-then-relief conditions reacted differently. In this
case, it was enough to have any kind of justification at all
for participants to be more likely to reach into their wallets
when compared to conditions in which the request was made
without accompanying justification. It also turned out that under
fear-then-relief condition, participants approached with unusual
messages (e.g., request with placebic justification or without any
justification) hardly ever asked any questions about the aim of
the action or campaign and the organizer of it. This pattern
of results is then quite congruent with the assumption that in
a situation involving a sudden withdrawal of the sources of
an emotion, mindlessness is caused by temporary deficits of
cognitive resources. This, in turn, is because cognitive resources
are directed elsewhere, such as turning off the fear-activated
program that is no longer adequate and/or coping with the
physiological consequences of the sudden drop of excitement.
One may therefore say that when an individual is in such an
unusual state, the cognitive system is busy recovering its own
balance. This interpretation is supported by results obtained in
several other experiments (e.g., Dolinski et al., 2002; Nawrat
and Dolinski, 2007; Dolinska and Dolinski, 2014; Kaczmarek,
2014).
In the present paper, however, we would like to offer
another cognitive-motivational framework for the fear-then-
relief phenomenon, which is complementary rather than
competitive to that presented above. It is based on the assumption
that the rapid change of emotions is connected with feelings of
uncertainty and confusion. The positive response to the request
is a form of coping with uncertainty (see van den Bos, 2001, 2009).
If this is the case, people less tolerant of ambiguity are more prone
to respond with positive behavior. Such people are characterized
by a high need for closure (NFC) (Kruglanski, 2013). NFC is
defined as “an individual’s desire for a firm answer to a question
and an aversion toward ambiguity” (Kruglanski and Webster,
1996, p. 264).
According to Kruglanski’s Lay epistemology theory
(Kruglanski, 2013), NFC is one of the three epistemic motivations
which affect people’s process of knowledge generating and
validating. The theory suggests a two-stage process in which
during the first stage the specific content (the hypothesis) is
created. This stage is termed “seizing.” The second stage is
devoted to validation of the cognitive content. The validation
stage involves an examination of the consistency between
the hypothesis and the person’s available knowledge, as well
as of alternative explanations to consistent or inconsistent
cognitive content generated by the individual. A central factor
in this stage is the epistemic motivation of the individual. The
epistemic motivation affects the validation process through two
mechanisms: “freezing” and “unfreezing.” Epistemic freezing
causes the individual to shorten the validation process and accept
the hypothesis in question as correct. In contrast, epistemic
unfreezing prolongs the validation process, which in turn
extends the period during which the individual is exposed to
uncertainty. NFC is an epistemic motivation which governs
the “freezing-unfreezing” activity. When high, NFC increases
the individual’s tendency to employ faster epistemic freezing
and achieve faster certainty in the validity of the hypothesis.
High NFC is also characterized by the use of “category based”
processing (Fiske and Pavelchak, 1986; Brewer, 1988), non-
systematic and heuristic processes. High-NFC individuals prefer
to use holistic and rapid processing, crudely differentiated
categories, black-and-white type solutions, and over-simplified
dichotomizations. All these enable the individual to achieve
the goal of avoiding uncertainty. In contrast, low NFC is
associated with unfreezing. That is, low NFC is associated with a
longer process of validation and extended period of uncertainty
regarding the validity of the hypothesis in question. Low NFC
is often associated with the use of “piecemeal” or “systematic
processing,” which is manifested in vigilant behavior based
on a systematic and effortful search for relevant information,
its evaluation, and unbiased integration (Janis and Mann,
1977; Chaiken et al., 1989). It is important to note that NFC
is often conceptualized as a dimension which, at its high pole,
predisposes individuals to use cognitive structuring to achieve
certainty. At its low pole, however, it is not associated with
indifference or low motivation to achieve certainty, but with
a high tendency toward piecemeal processes (Kruglanski and
Webster, 1996). Finally, according to lay epistemology theory,
NFC is both a trait-like characteristic, as well as situationally
determined.
When applying the explanation of NFC to the fear-then-
relief phenomenon, it can be suggested that compliance with
the request frees individuals from the need to validate how
they want to respond to the request. This in turn extends the
uncertainty experienced in the situation. Therefore it is expected
that participants’ NFC levels would moderate the effect of fear-
then-relief. While individuals with high NFC will comply with
a request after a fear-then-relief situation, low-NFC individuals
who are less threatened by uncertainty will not.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A group of 120 university students (60 women, 60 men, aged
17–53 with M = 22.95; SD = 6.63) were randomly assigned to
one of the two conditions: control and experimental (fear-then-
relief).
Procedure and Measures
In a laboratory room participants individually completed a
scale devoted to measuring their NFC. We used the Polish
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version (Kossowska, 2003) of the NFC scale (Webster and
Kruglanski, 1994). Respondents rated 32 items on a six-point
scale (from 1= completely disagree to 6= completely agree). The
reliability of the scale in the present study was high (Cronbach’s
α= 0.82). The mean score for all items was calculated: M = 3.69;
SD = 0.46. A higher mean score indicated a higher level of
NCS.
When the scale was completed the experimenter thanked the
participant, and at this very moment a female confederate entered
the room saying “sorry for interrupting.” In the fear-then-relief
condition she continued, asking the participant “Haven’t you lost
your wallet?” At this moment, participants impulsively checked
their pockets or searched their bags. They also surveyed the wallet
simultaneously presented by the confederate (the one chosen for
the study was very original and unusual) and then stated that
it was not they who had lost the wallet. The confederate thus
continued: “Oh, I’ll have to take it to the University Information
Desk then. . . but as we are already talking. . . I am a member
of a students’ committee organizing the celebrations of the 20th
anniversary of our University. Would you agree to help us
organize the events?” If the answer was positive, the confederate
continued: “how many hours of activity do you declare, more or
less?”
Two of the participants (one female and one male) did
not respond in accordance with the assumed scenario,
and in response to the confederate’s question “Haven’t
you lost your wallet?” calmly responded that they had
not, without betraying any sign of disquiet. In addition,
during the post-experiment debriefing two other individuals
(men) declared their suspicions that the episode with the
wallet was not an accident, but rather an element in the
experiment. The results of all these participants were
excluded and four additional individuals were included in
the study.
In the control condition the confederate entered the room,
excused herself for causing the interruption and asked the
participant for assistance in organizing events during the
anniversary celebrations.
The participant’s consent to help in the organization of the
anniversary celebrations and the number of hours of activity
declared were treated as dependent variables.
At the very beginning of the experiment, just after arriving
at the laboratory, study participants signed a declaration
stating that they expressed their informed consent to
participation in a psychological experiment which would
measure certain individual character traits, as well as reactions
to various events (because of the necessity of inducing in
the participants a state of unexpected fear followed by
relief, it was not possible to give them full and detailed
information about the experimental procedure). Immediately
after the experiment, each study participant went through
a thorough debriefing process. None of them expressed
any reservations concerning the course of the experiment.
The design and the experiment conditions for the study
were approved by the local University of Social Science and
Humanities Ethics Committee in accordance with the Helsinki
Declaration.
RESULTS
To test the hypothesis on compliance, we performed a logistic
regression in two steps. In the first step, we introduced the
two independent variables (NFC and manipulation), and in
the second step the interaction between the two variables.
Table 1 shows that in the first step only the manipulation had
a significant effect on compliance. The interaction in the second
step was of marginal significance. In addition, we performed a
regression analysis with the same independent variables on the
second dependent variable (number of hours). Table 2 shows
that in the first step only the manipulation (fear-then-relief vs.
control condition) achieved significance. In the second step, the
interaction term contributed significantly to the explanation of
the dependent variable. To further explore the source of the
interaction two simple slopes were calculated for high and low
NFC individuals (one SD above and below the mean). The
results show that while for low-NFC individuals the regression
coefficient is not significant (b = 0.11, SE = 0.56, t = 0.21,
p = 0.83, LLCI = −0.99, ULCI = 1.22), it is significant
for high-NFC individuals (b = 2.14, SE = 0.55, t = 3.84,
p = 0.002, LLCI = 1.03, ULCI = 3.24). Thus, the research
hypothesis is confirmed. The effect of fear-then-relief on low-
NFC individuals was lower than on high-NFC individuals. In fact,
the effect of fear-then-relief exists only in the case of high-NFC
individuals.
DISCUSSION
Theoretical Implications
In our experiment, we demonstrated the existence of individual
differences in susceptibility to the “fear-then-relief” technique. In
respect of compliance measured on an interval scale (declared
TABLE 1 | Logistic regression of the moderating effect of need for closure
(NFC) on the relationship between manipulation of fear-then-relief state
and binomial measure of compliance.
B SE Wald Cox & Snell R2 Sig.
Step 1 0.13
NFC −0.03 0.21 0.2 0.88
Conditions 0.83 0.22 14.06 0.00
Step 2 0.15
NFC × Conditions 0.42 0.24 3.10 0.08
TABLE 2 | Regression analysis of the moderating effect of NFC on the
relationship between manipulation of fear-then-relief state and the
interval measure of compliance.
B SE β T Sig.
Step 1
NFC 0.10 0.40 0.02 0.24 0.81
Conditions 1.13 0.40 0.25 2.80 0.01
Step 2
NFC × Conditions 1.01 0.40 0.22 2.56 0.01
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number of hours of activity on behalf of the University), the
technique was successful in respect of individuals characterized
by a high need for cognitive closure, while ineffective toward
those with a low need for cognitive closure. This effect
expands knowledge on the efficacy of social influence techniques,
and particularly that of fear-then-relief. It also constitutes a
complementary theoretical interpretation of the effectiveness of
that technique compared to the “classic” one which assumes
that the feeling of sudden relief induces a state of mindlessness
(Dolinski, 2001). The results we have generated allow us to
assume that in a condition of relief following the experience of
fear, people are motivated to reduce uncertainty. The research
presented in this article corresponds well with other data on the
role played by cognitive structuring in various social influence
processes. There is empirical data showing that a high need
for cognitive closure is conducive to conformism (Calogero
et al., 2009; Chao et al., 2010), susceptibility to the disrupt-then-
reframe technique (Kardes et al., 2007), and to persuasion in
conditions of absence of an initial informational base for an
opinion (Kruglanski et al., 1993). Individuals characterized by
high NFC are also more susceptible to depletion of cognitive
resources than those with low NFC in conditions involving
resisting the influence of an authority figure (Damen et al.,
2014).
Practical Implications
From the perspective of the practical application of fear-then-
relief, we may posit the careful hypothesis that it should be
particularly successful in situations involving conditions of
uncertainty and confusion (this carefulness results from the fact
that in our study we did not apply situational stimulation of
NFC, and we treated this construct as a stable individual trait).
It is also worth observing that practitioners of social influence
usually do not apply individual techniques, but a chain of various
methods, and they modify their selection of persuasive strategies
based on the development of the situation (e.g., Goldman, 1986;
Howard, 1995). It would therefore seem that if the fear-then-
relief fails in respect of a particular person, this will be someone
characterized by a low NFC rather than someone with a high
NFC. Practitioners of social influence should thus apply measures
that are appropriate for people with low NFC (e.g., present them
a large amount of new and complex information – see: Luttrell
et al., 2014 for review).
Limitations
A few limitations associated with our empirical determinations
should be emphasized. Firstly, the conclusion on the role played
by need for cognitive closure in compliance with fear-then-relief
is based on one study. Secondly, in our study need for cognition
was treated as a personality factor. It is not certain whether
an analogical structure of results would be achieved by treating
need for cognitive closure as a factor of a situational nature.
Thirdly, the role of need for cognitive closure was only observed
when compliance with the request was treated as an interval
variable (number of declared hours of work for the University).
For the dichotomous variable (do you agree to participate in
organizing a celebration for the University’s 20th anniversary?)
only the main fear-then-relief effect was clearly noted, and the
interaction of this factor with NFC did not achieve statistical
significance.
Future Directions
Although our results are congruent with the assumption that
uncertainty is particularly aversive for people characterized by
high need for cognitive closure, and this is precisely why they are
susceptible to the fear-then-relief technique, we did not directly
examine the mechanism itself. Future experiments should thus
aim at exploring the mediational role of experiencing uncertainty.
In other studies devoted to the role played by cognitive
structuring processes in the fear-then-relief technique, we plan
to examine whether an analogical pattern of dependencies is
obtained when we manipulate the NFC (rather than measure
it with a survey as in the present study). We also intend
to examine the role played by another element of cognitive
structuring, namely, ability to achieve cognitive structure. From
the theoretical perspective, we may expect that differentiated
ability should also lead to differentiated reactions to the request
that appears when the individual first experiences an unexpected
fear, and then unexpected relief (and thus in an unclear and
unexpected situation).
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